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In the Supreme Court
of the

State of Utah
M.A. STRAND, doing business as Strand
Electric Service Company,

Plaintiff and Appellant}
Case No. 8594

vs.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This was an action for breach of contract. From a judgment
dismissing the action on the ground that it was barred by the
four year statute of limitations, the plaintiff has appealed.
Under date of December 10, 1943, plaintiff and defendant
entered into a written contract under which the plaintiff was
to constuct for the defendant a signal pole line between Caliente
and Rox, Nevada (Exhibit 1). The contract incorporated certain photostats and drawings and provided, generally, that

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the signal pole line would consist of approximately ten wires
and would be constructed along the Railroad Company's rightof-way between Caliente and Rox, a distance of approximately
sixty miles. As compensation for this work, the defendant was
to pay unit prices as specified in the contract. Unit prices were
set out for installing poles (including crossarms and braces),
((H" fixtures, guys, line wire, aerial cable, etc.; the unit prices
for installing poles and guys varied, depending upon whether
they were installed in loose earth or in rock (Exhibit 1, p. 2).
The defendant also undertook to bear the cost of transporting
persons, tools, equipment and materials required in the performance of the work. Poles and crossarms were to be distributed along the right of way by the defendant in the vicinity
of points of installation (Exhibit 1, pp. 2a and 2b). The signal
pole line was to run approximately 40 feet from the tracks
(Exhibit 1, Specifications for Signal Pole Line, P. 1).
Among the contract provisions was one relating to adjustments in price for extra work. Section 9 (Exhibit 1, p. 4) provided:
((EXTRA WORK. It is understood and agreed that
the Railroad Company shall have the right to make such
changes in the amount, dimensions or character of the
work to be done hereunder as, in the opinion of the
Engineer, the interests of the work or of the Railroad
Company may require; and if any such changes or
alterations should diminish the quantity of the work
to be done they shall not constitute a claim for damages
for anticipated profits on the work so dispensed with.
Any increase in the amount of the work to be done, that
may result from such changes, shall be paid for at the
same rates as similar work is herein contracted to be
paid for; and, if such work is not similar to that herein
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contracted for, the Contractor shall submit information
concerning the nature of the same to the Engineer
before such work is commenced and it shall be classified
as cextra work' and paid for at prices to be agreed upon
between the Engineer and the Contractor, prior to the
commencement of the same; but, if the Contractor and
the Engineer are unable to agree upon a price for such
extra work, the Railroad Company may enter into a
contract with any other party or parties for its execution or may itself perform any and all such extra work
the same as if this contract had never existed. In case
the Contractor does not present a claim in writing to
the Engineer on account of the dissimilarity in the work
by reason of such change within ten days after such
change has been explained, the Contractor shall be
forever estopped from making any claim therefor.
A related provision was Section 20 (Exhibit 1, p. 9) :
celt is distinctly understood and declared by the Contractor that this contract is made for the consideration
herein named, solely on information derived from others
than the Railroad Company, its officers, agents or employees, and that the plans and specifications governing
the work are subject to change and alteration as herein
provided. Any deviation from said plans and specifications will be considered as an alteration and shall be
determined as provided in Section· 9 hereof.''
Under the terms of Section 4 of the contract (Exhibit 1,
p. 3), the plaintiff was to furnish a bond in the amount of
$20,000 for the faithful performance of the contract or ccany
change or modification thereof or addition thereto." The
plaintiff did furnish a bond as required by this Section (Exhibit
1, following p. 13).
Plaintiff began work on the project on about February 15,
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1944. At the outset some difficulty was experienced because
of the failure of the defendant to deliver to the jobsite a railroad car containing the major basic tools and equipment of
the plaintiff (R. 32). The defendant's engineering department
staked out the course of the signal pole line (R. 37), but in so
doing did not stake the line 40 feet from the nearest main track
rail. The lines were placed about 90 to 100 feet from the track
rail ~(pretty consistent for the first ten miles" of the signal pole.
line (R. 39). The poles and crossarms, contemplated by the
contract to have been delivered along the right of way ((at
points of installation" (Exhibit 1, Specifications, General Information, p. [b]) were in fact scattered along the track from a
moving car, some distance from the point of installation
(R. 44). In addition, the railroad company required the plaintiff to return to some areas and install extra crossarms at an
increase in costs (Exhibit 3) . These changes in the performance
required of the plaintiff were a major factor in his financial
inability to go on with the contract (R. 44; Exhibit 3) . The
plaintiff spent more in bringing poles and other material to
the site of construction than in actually building the line (Exhibit 3, p. 2).
In the first part of September, 1944, plaintiff met in Omaha,
Nebraska, with representatives of the defendant corporation,
including Mr. Dickinson, the ((Engineer" under the contract
(R. 66 and 67). At that meeting plaintiff explained the difficulties encountered on the job and the construction costs which
had resulted from placing the line at greater distances than
40 feet from the right-of-way (R. 67). At that time the railroad
company agreed, in substance, to change the method of com-
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pensation in the contract from a unit price basis to a cost basis
(R. 74). The railroad company also agreed with the plaintiff
that the date for completion of the line would be extended to
late December, 1944 (R. 763). Subsequently, a second meeting
was held, this one in Salt Lake City, Utah. Present at the meeting were the plaintiff, the plaintiff's son, LeRoy Strand, and
Oscar Jorgenson, accountant for the plaintiff (R. 69). Among
those present on behalf of the defendant was B. H. Prater,
the chief engineer for the railroad company. At this meeting
the defendant again agreed with the plaintiff, this time through
Mr. Prater, that the plaintiff's costs of performance would be
paid for by the defendant (R. 69).
The plaintiff resumed work under the agreement; but on
December 5, 1944, L. D. Dickinson, defendant's general signal
engineer, wrote to both the plaintiff and the New Amsterdam
Casualty Company, surety on plaintiff's performance bond,
indicating that action woud be taken on the bond if the job
were not speeded up to the satisfaction of the Railroad Company (Exhibit 4) .
It was established by the pleadings that the signal pole
line was completed on or about January 7, 1945, and was at that
time approved and accepted by the defendant (R. 8, 15). The
complaint in the present action (R. 1) was filed on December
20, 1950. The defendant raised the affirmative defense that
the claim was barred by the statute of limitations relating to
an !(obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in
writing" (R. 17). On July 9 and 10, 1956, a hearing was had
before the Honorable Jesse R. Budge, who had been appointed
a judge pro tempore for the purposes of this proceeding. At
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the July 9 and 10 hearing the issues were confined to the applicability of the statute of limitations to the plaintiff's second
cause of action (R. 80 and 81). Notwithstanding the scope of
the hearing, the Court on August 2, 1956, entered Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the effect that the plaintiff's
claim was barred by the statute of limitations (R. 84-86). Pursuant to the Conclusions of Law, judgment was entered on
August 2, 1956, dismissing the plaintiff's action (R. 87).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The Court's Fin dings of Fact are contrary to and not

supported by the evidence.
2. The Court erred in its Conclusions of Law applicable

to the facts of the case.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONTRARY
TO AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
The Findings of Fact with which appellant takes issues are
Nos. 4 and 5 insofar as they find the agreement between the
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parties was materially altered and modified by the agreement
of September, 1944, and find that the December 10, 1943 contract, because of the agreement of September, 1944, was an
agreement ((partly in writing and partly oral." Inasmuch as
these findings were closely connected with the- conclusion of
law that the action is barred by the four year statute of limitations, appellant will argue both of the points together.
It cannot be disputed that the contract of December 10,
1943, was an integrated contract containing all of the necessary
and material agreements between the parties. As of that date,
any action brought upon it would undoubtedly have been an
action upon a tccontract, obligation or liability founded upon
an instrument in writing" within the meaning of 78-12-23 Utah
Code Annotated 195 3. It is the contention of appellant that
the agreement of September, 1944, was one contemplated by
the provisions of Section 9 and 20 of the contract, and was,
therefore, merely one step involved in performance of the
original agreement. Being this, it could be shown by parol
without affecting the character"- of the original document.
n

We do not quarrel with the rule relied upon by the Court
below that agreements which are ((partly in writing and partly
oral" ordinarily come within the statute of limitations applying
to oral contracts. 129 A.L.R. 603 (Annotation). The line of
cases so holding, however, do not hold that the written part
of the contract must contain every detail of performance. As
stated by the writer of the annotation cited above:
((The necessity of introducing evidence extrinsic to
a written contract to establish the amount of money to
which the plaintiff is entitled under such contract, where

9
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there appears from the written contract an obligation
of the defendant to pay money of some amount, conditionally or unconditionally, does not render inapplicable a statute of limitations pertaining to written
contracts or writings for the payment of money."
The view expressed in A.L.R. finds support in a number
of cases. See, for example, Lewis v. Taylor, 204 S.W. 383
(Tex. Civ. App., 1918), and cases therein cited. The action in
Lewis v. Taylor was brought for the price of a carload· of wheat,
the written contract upon which the plaintiff relied having been
composed of letters and telegrams. It appeared that after the
exchange of letters and telegrams the price was changed verbally. The court held that inasmuch as the contract was in writing,
a change in price would not affect the written contract, and the
statute applicable to writings should govern.
In Fabian et al. v. Lammers (1906), 3 Cal. App. 109,
84 Pac. 432, adjoining landowners had contracts to build some
levees across their respective properties as a step in reclamation
of their lands from a swamp condition. The contract provided
that the levees would be built cto£ the same size, height, width,
character, and in accordance with" the decision of a named
civil engineer. When the defendant failed to complete his
levee at the agreed time the plaintiff completed it for him and
brought an action for damages. The defendant claimed that
the contract was partly written and partly oral, by virtue of the
reference to a decision of the engineer, and was therefore barred
by the limitation on oral contracts. The court acknowledged
that the rule requires contracts to be entirely written in order
to come within the statutes pertaining to written contracts but
added:
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CCHow could this apply to the contracts in this case?
Here the thing contracted to be done is to build a levee
of sufficient height and width, to be determined by the
parties to the contract or by a civil engineer. We think
it sufficient that the contract was certain as to the parties
and their respective agreement. What the defendant
agreed to do is ascertained therefrom to a common
certainty.''
In W. T. Rawleigh Company v. Graham (1940), 4 Wash.
2d 407, 103 P. 2d 1076, the Rawleigh Company brought an
action against sureties on certain contracts for the retail sale
of Rawleigh products. In the agreements under which the sales
were made the defendants had promised to pay the plaintiff
for goods and merchandise sold to the principal buyer under
the contract. The contract, however, did not set out the prices
at which the sales would be made or at which merchandise
would be delivered by Rawleigh to the buyer. In the present
action the defendants contended that inasmuch as the amount
to be paid must be proved by evidence outside the written
contract, the statute of limitations governing oral contracts
should be applied. The court held for the plaintiff, saying:
CCThe written contract relied upon by the respondent
is complete and furnished an objective standard for the
ascertainment of any amount due thereunder from
[the principal debtor] to respondent."
In Lyons et al v. Moise's Executor (1944), 298 Ky. 858,
183 S.W. 2d 493, the decedent Moise had entered into a contract with W. L. Lyons & Company, a brokerage firm, under
which Moise was to have a trading account with Lyons. The
agreement provided, among other things, that Moise agreed
to ccbe bound by the rules, regulations and customs prevailing

11
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in any market or exchange wherein you execute any orders as
my agent at my direction, and to reimburse you for usual commissions and any advances made by you for my account." The
brokerage firm brought an action against the executor to recover on the accounts maintained by Moise during his life time.
The executor defended on the ground that the contracf was
executed only for the purpose of securing oral transactions
and that the statute relating to oral transactions should govern.
It was argued that the writing was an attempt to extend the
five year statute, which was void as against public policy. The
court held that the statute relating to writings was the one
that governed. It said:
(tif the written contract contains a definite promise
to pay, but does not name the amount, the fact that the
amount must be ascertained by evidence aliunde does
not bring the contract into the category of one partly
in writing and partly oral, but it remains a complete,
written contract and is controlled by the limitation
applicable to written contracts."
A similar holding is found in Brown v. Irving, 269 S.W.
686 _(Mo. App. 1925). In that case there was a contract relating
to· the organization of a corporation. In the contract the defendant promised, in exchange for a transfer of stock, ua sum
in cash equal to the difference between $12,500 and the cost
of reorganization of said company in sale of $90,000 par value
of the preferred stock of said company." In an action on this
contract the defendant contended that this provision was
"merely an understanding, that if after paying the cost of reorganization, etc.... there was any difference ... the defendant would account to the plaintiff for the difference." The
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court held that the action was one on the contract, not for an
accounting, and that the limitation relating to written contracts
applied. The court said:
ttlt is held that if evidence aliunde of the contract
is necessary in order to establish the promise, the ten
year statute does not apply (citing case), but it is the
promise to pay that must be provided for by the language of the writing, and such a promise cannot arise
by proving extrinsic facts. However, the amount to be
paid may be shown by evidence aliunde. The ten year
statute of limitations applies if the cause of action is
upon any writing for the payment of money or property
which expressly or impliedly promises or agrees to pay
money or property, whether the payment is to be certain
or contingent.''
The Utah territorial statute of limitations was applied in
Streeper et al v. Victor Sewing-Machine Company ( 1885), 112
U.S. 676, 5 S. Ct. 327, 28 L. Ed. 852. There an action had
been brought upon a bond given in connection with a contract
for the retail sale of sewing machines. The bond was conditioned upon the retailer's accounting for the proceeds of sales
and purchase price of attachments, of paying personal notes
for goods consigned, and of guaranteeing notes of others for
sewing machines sold. In this action on the bond the sureties
defended, in part, on the ground that the liability of the defendant arose on the sales of goods to the consignee, and that
the action was barred by the two year statute of limitations.
The United States Supreme Court, in applying the territorial
act, held that the four year (written) statute was applicable:
CCEven as regards the consignees, an action against
them, if not on the bond, would be on the written agree-
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ment. The condition of the bond is, that the consignees
shall pay all moneys which shall become due (under
or pursuant to the within contract, or which shall arise
therefrom, whether by book accounts, notes, renewals
or extensions of notes or accounts.' We are of the
opinion that, this suit being on a written instrument,
the limitation was four years, the action was not barred."
If the contract of December 10, 1943, had been a straight
fixed-price contract with no provisions for changes in the plans
and specifications and no provisions for changes in price because of such changes in the plans and specifications, the Court
below might have correctly held that the September, 1944,
agreement was a material modification or alteration of the
earlier contract converting it into one ({partly written and partly
oral." But the provisions for changes and compensation for
them are of vital importance. Section 9 of the contract contemplated that some extra work would be done; and some of it
might be of such a character that the unit prices set out in the
contract would not be applicable. The contract provided that
in event work is not similar to that herein contracted for" it
n

would (after certain other steps were taken) be paid for Hat
prices to be agreed upon between the Engineer and the Contractor.'' And if Section 9 was not broad enough as written to
include modifications of the type involved inthis action, the
railroad company added to its efficacy by the provisions of
Section 20 which stated that ttany deviation from sa1d plans
and specifications will be considered as an alteration and shall
be determined as provided in Section 9 hereof."
In view of the contract provisions, we believe it must be
conceded that the changes in the placement of the signal pole
14
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line, and the requirement that the contractor retrace his steps
in order to add extra crossarms, were nalterations" within the
meaning of Sections 9 and 20 of the contract. We think it must
be conceded, too, that the work as altered was ((not similar"
to the unaltered work as the phrase is used in Section 9. This
being true, the prices to be fixed for the alterations were to be
fixed by agreement between the contractor and the ((Engineer."
By the terms of Section 5 of the contract, the nEngineer" was
to be the ((Chief Signal Engineer." The person who signed the
contract with the plaintiff as nChief Signal Engineer" was
L. D. Dickinson. At the September meeting in Omaha it was
L. D. Dickinson who agreed with plaintiff that the unit price
basis of payment would be.cha~ged to a cost basis (R. 66, 67).
The use of changes articles in contracts has long been
recognized as a valid method of providing for future co!ltingencies. The United States Supreme Court has characterized
a contract with a changes article as one in which the compensation was to be ((the contract price, reduced by damages deducted for delays and increased or reduced by the price of
changes." Crook Company v. United States ( 1925) 270 U.S. 4,
70 L. Ed. 438, 46 S. Ct. 184. If, in the present case, the changes
had resulted in the contractor doing work which was ((similar"
to the work provided in the contract (so that the unit prices
would be applicable) we do not doubt that the contractor
would have been able to show by parol the extra work done,
and such showing would not have the effect of magically transforming the December 10, 1943, contract into one that was
'(partly written and partly oral.'' As view~d by the Court below,
it: made all the difference in the world to the enforceability of
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the contract that the work was not {(similar," and that as a
consequence the contractor and the engineer reached an agreement, pursuant to Section 9, on the prices to be paid. We believe it was permissible for the contractor and engineer to agree
to change the basis of compensation for performing the changed
work, just as 1t would have been permissible for them to agree
to increase unit prices sufficiently to compensate the contractor
for the changes. Nor do we regard as of any significance the
question of whether the agreement between the contractor and
the Chief Engineer was reached prior to or after the work was
begun. That technical provisions such as those relating to orders
in writing, time for making claims for extras, and procedures
for determining the amount of price adjustment can be waived
is well settled. 9 Am. Jur., Building and Construction Contracts, § 23. The railroad company continued to act as if the
September agreement between the contractor and the Chief
Engineer was within the scope of the original contract. The
letter of December 5, 1944 (Exhibit 4) and the letter of February 16, 1945 (Exhibit 6) show that the defendant considered
the alterations to be of such a nature, within the scope of the
original contract or bond, that the surety was not discharged by
the extension of time and agreement for change in the basis of
compensation.
Although this Court has not ruled directly upon the effect
of changes in applying the statute of limitations, a recent
case has recognized that changes made under contracts are
merely part of the performance and can be shown by evidence
outside the original contract. Hardinge Conzpany v. Eimco
Corporation ( 1954), 1 Utah 2d 320, 266 P. 2d 494, involved
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a contract for the sale of merchandise. Under the terms of the
original contract the seller, Eimco, was to pay the freight from
Salt Lake City to York, Pennsylvania. By plaintiff's ctAlteration
B" the price was reduced. Later an ((Alteration E" was issued
by the plaintiff to the defendant directing shipment by government bill of lading to Marietta, Pennsylvania, about twenty miles
from York. The alterations issued were brief and apparently
were signed by buyer only; they did not themselves contain
all of the elements of a contract. The alteration requiring
shipment to Marietta made no mention of the payment of
freight, but only that the shipment would be by government
bill of lading ((collect." Thereafter, Hardinge Company, the
buyer, was required to pay the freight costs to the Government
and sought to recover from Eimco. In defending the action,
Eimco contended that it was not based upon an instrument
in writing but was for money paid by mistake and was governed
b~ the four year statute of limitations. In affirming a judgment
for the plaintiff, the Court said:
''The effect of Alteration E was to provide shipping
instructions under an agreement already determined.
It is fundamental that if effect can be given to both of
two apparently conflicting provisions in a reasonable
reconciliation that interpretation will control.

*

*

*

*

"The rights of the Hardinge Company arose under
the contract regardless of the fact the money was in the
hands of Eimco at the time the suit was brought; if
the price had not been stated in the contract, Hardinge
would have no right to recover. Therefore, the promise
was express and the action was founded upon a contract
in writing and brought within the limitation period set
forth in U.C.A. 1953, 78-12-23."
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The Court went on to cite the general rule that ((if a substantial doubt exists as to which is the applicable statute of
limitations, the longer rather than the shorter period of limitation is to be preferred."

CONCLUSION
Under construction contracts such as the one involved in
this case, in which contracts the parties have included provisions
for changes in the details of performance and correlative provisions for adjustments in price because of such changes, parol
evidence relating to the changes made and the correct resultant
price adjustment rnay be introduced without reducing the written
contract to the status of one ((partly written and partly oral."
It is submitted that the case is no different because of the circumstance that the contract provides for agreement as to the
adjusted price with reference to certain types of extras or
changes. Action taken by the parties in agreeing to a price
change for alterations in the plans and specifications is taken
under the terms of the original written contract.
Provisions for making changes in plans and specifications,
and for making price adjustments for them, are a necessity
tn a world in which complex building projects require a degree
of flexibility in contracting. The needs of the construction
industry would be hampered and the parties reduced to headbutting if it were consistently held that their attempts at
harmonious settlements of questions arising under contracts
would ultimately prejudice their chances of recovering under
the contract.
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It is submitted that the agreement between the contractor
and the engineer to change the compensation from a unit price
to a cost basis was not a modification of the original contract,
that it was an nalteration'' within the terms of the contract, and
that the ccalteration" does not make the contract ccpartly written
and partly oral" as ruled by the trial court. The contractor
should be permitted to recover on the written contract, as
changed. Certainly the attempt to proceed under the contract
terms should not be given the effect of not only depriving the
plaintiff of its provisions but of destroying his right to damages
for any breach of the original contract by the defendant.
The trial court having properly found that defendant
agreed to pay on a cost basis, the judgment should be reversed
and the case remanded to the District Court for determination
of the amount due from defendant to plaintiff under the contract as changed by the parties pursuant to Section 9 and 20.
Respectfully submitted
ALLAN E. MECHAM
GROVER A. GILES and
BRYCE E. ROE

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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